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Warsaw Convention Liability Limitations:
Constitutional Issues
I. INTRODUCTION
The Warsaw Convention' is a multilateral treaty adhered to by the
United States in 1934, which establishes a uniform set of substantive and
procedural rules governing international air transportation.2 Article 22'
1 The Warsaw Convention is the informal title for Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, concluded at Warsaw, Poland, opened for
signature October 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11, reprinted in 49 U.S.C.A.
app. at 430 (West Supp. 1976) (adhered to by the United States June 27, 1934).
2 Article 1(2), which defines "international transportation," reads:
For the purposes of this convention the expression "international transportation" shall mean
any transportation in which, according to the contract made by the parties, the place of depar-
ture and the place of destination, whether or not there be a break in the transportation or a
transshipment, are situated either within the territories of two High Contracting Parties, or
within the territory of a single High Contracting Party, if there is an agreed stopping place
within a territory subject to the sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate or authority of another power,
even though that power is not a party to this convention. Transportation without such an
agreed stopping place between territories subject to the sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate, or
authority of the same High Contracting Party shall not be deemed to be international for the
purposes of this convention. Id at 3014, T.S. No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. at 15, reprinted in 49
U.S.C.A. app. at 430 (West Supp. 1976).
3 Article 22 of the Convention reads:
(1) In the transportation of passengers the liability of the carrier for each passenger shall be
limited to the sum of 125,000 francs. Where, in accordance with the law of the court to which
the case is submitted, damages may be awarded in the form of periodic payments, the equivalent
capital value of the said payments shall not exceed 125,000 francs. Nevertheless, by special
contract, the carrier and the passenger may agree to a higher limit of liability. (2) In the trans-
portation of checked baggage and of goods, the liability of the carrier shall be limited to a sum
of 250 francs per kilogram, unless the consignor has made, at the time when the package was
handed over to the carrier, a special declaration of the value at delivery and has paid a supple-
mentary sum if the case so requires. In that case the carrier will be liable to pay a sum not
exceeding the declared sum, unless he proves that that sum is greater than the actual value to
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of the Convention establishes liability limitations4 for international air
carriers of baggage, cargo, and passengers.
The Montreal Agreement' is a special contract signed by the airlines
in 1966. The Agreement increases the limitation on liability per passen-
ger from the Convention's gold limit equivalent of $8,300 to a dollar
limit of $75,000.6 This increase affects only the limitation on liability for
personal injury or death.7 The Agreement does not affect the limitations
on liability for baggage and cargo.' As a result, the current limitation on
liability for personal injury or death, on one hand, and the limitations on
liability for cargo and baggage, on the other, are expressed in different
units: the former in dollars, the latter in milligrams of gold.9
the consignor at delivery. (3) As regards objects of which the passenger takes charge himself
the liability of the carrier shall be limited to 5,000 francs per passenger. (4) The sums men-
tioned above shall be deemed to refer to the French franc consisting of 65 milligrams of gold at
the standard fineness of nine hundred thousandths. These sums may be converted into any
national currency in round figures.
Id. at 3019, T.S.No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. at 25, reprinted in 49 U.S.C.A. app. at 434 (West Supp. 1976).
4 The liability limitations have become increasingly controversial. Ever since the United States
adhered to the Convention in 1934, the controversy has focused on the view that the liability limita-
tions are too low. "[The underlying and recurring theme of all the discussions [following the United
States adherence in 1934] was whether the limit had been set at the right level." Lowenfeld and
Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARv. L. REv. 497, 504 (1967).
5 CAB Order No. E-23680, 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966) [hereinafter cited as CAB order], re-
printed in Civil Aeronautics Board, Aeronautical Statutes and Related Material, at 425 (1970).
The Montreal Agreement is a private agreement signed by the airlines under the auspices of the
International Air Transport Association (IATA) and the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB). I. The
Agreement is under the authority of Article 22(1) of the Warsaw Convention, which provides that
"by special contract, the carrier and the passenger may agree to a higher limit of liability" with
regard to the limitation on liability per passenger. Id.
On November 15, 1965, the United States Government gave notice of denunciation of the War-
saw Convention under authority of Article 39. Id. Article 39 of the Convention reads in part:
(1) Any one of the High Contracting Parties may denounce this convention by a
notification....
(2) Denunciation shall take effect six months after the notification of denunciation, and shall
operate only as regards the party which shall have proceeded to denunciation.
The United States emphasized that the sole reason for the notice of denunciation was that the
liability limitations for personal injury or death were too low. CAB Order No. E-23680, 31 Fed.
Reg. 7302 (1966). The United States withdrew the notice of denunciation in return for the airlines'
signatures to the Montreal Agreement. Ia.
The Montreal Agreement increases the per passenger liability limitation for personal injury or
death to $75,000 including legal fees, or $58,000 exclusive of legal fees and costs where awards are so
separated. Id. In addition, the Montreal Agreement provides that the airlines waive the due care
defense of Article 20(1) of the Convention. Article 20(1) of the Warsaw Convention reads: "The
carrier shall not be liable if he proves that he and his agents have taken all necessary measures to
avoid the damage or that it was impossible for him or them to take such measures." As a result, the




9 The limitation on liability for personal injury or death is $75,000 per passenger. See supra
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The Montreal Protocols are a recent proposal for legislative modifi-
cation of the Warsaw Convention-Montreal Agreement.10 The Proto-
cols, if they had been ratified, would have expressed all liability
limitations in terms of the SDR, a unit based on an international basket
of currencies. 1 Under the Montreal Protocols, the limitation on liability
for personal injury or death would have increased from $75,000 to
100,000 SDRs (equivalent to about $120,000).12 The limitation on liabil-
ity for cargo, on the other hand, would have remained about the same.
13
Nevertheless, on March 8, 1983, the Senate's 50-42 vote in favor of the
Montreal Protocols fell short of the two-thirds majority required for
consent. 14
In T. W.A., Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., the United States Supreme
Court held that "the (Warsaw) Convention's cargo liability limit remains
enforceable in the United States."' 5 Nevertheless, the Court did not ad-
dress the question of whether any of the liability limitations of the War-
saw Convention-Montreal Agreement are unconstitutional. Nor had the
Second Circuit in Franklin Mint reached that question.' 6
note 5. The limitation on liability for cargo and checked baggage is 250 francs per kilogram. For
unchecked baggage the limit is 5,000 francs per passenger. The sums in francs refer to French francs
each equivalent to 65 milligrams of gold. See supra note 3.
10 SENATE COMMrTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, MONTREAL PROTOcOLs Nos. 3 AND 4, S.
Rep. No. 1, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1983).
11 Ia. at 29-32.
12 Id at 4.
13 See T.W.A. Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 104 S. Ct. 1776, 1785-86 (1984).
14 129 CONG. REc. S2270 (daily ed. March 8, 1983).
The Montreal Protocols were defeated in part because they would have made the liability limi-
tations unbreakable even in cases of willful misconduct. That is, the Montreal Protocols would have
abolished Article 25(1) of the Warsaw Convention, which reads:
The carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the provisions of this convention which
exclude or limit his liability, if the damage is caused by his wilful misconduct or by such default
on his part as, in accordance with the law of the court to which the case is submitted, is consid-
ered to be equivalent to wilful misconduct.
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air,
opened for signature October 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3020, T.S. No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 27, reprinted in 49
U.S.C.A. app. at 434 (West Supp. 1976).
More importantly, the Protocols failed ratification because even with the proposed increase, the
liability limitations were viewed as still too low. The opponents of the Montreal Protocols urged
that defeat of the Protocols would lead to the result they ultimately desired-unlimited liability.
This result, so the opponents theorized, would follow from either United States withdrawal from the
Convention or refusal by United States courts to enforce the liability limitations. In theory, these
reactions would stem from dissatisfaction with the intolerably low liability limitations. See Krein-
dler, Montreal Protocols Defeated, N.Y.L.J., April 4, 1983, at 1, col. 1; See also Hollings, Defeat of
the Montreal Protocols: Victory for Airline Passengers, 19 Trial 20 (May, 1983); Hollings, The Mon-
treal Protocols: A Threat to the American System of Jurisprudence, 18 Trial 69 (Sept., 1982).
15 T.W.A., 104 S. Ct. at 1787.
16 Franklin Mint Corp. v. T.W.A., Inc., 690 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1982), affid, 104 S. Ct. 1776
(1984) (The Supreme Court afflirmed the court of appeal's judgement enforcing in the case before it
Warsaw Convention Liability Limitations
6:896(1984)
Similarly, in In re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia, the Ninth Circuit did
not reach the question of the constitutionality of the Warsaw Conven-
tion-Montreal Agreement liability limitations. 7 Nevertheless, the court
of appeals sua sponte raised the question of whether the Warsaw Conven-
tion-Montreal Agreement's limitation of liability to $75,000 per passen-
ger is a "taking of property without just compensation.""8 The court
held that the court of claims would be the proper forum for a determina-
tion on the "taking" issue.' 9 The Ninth Circuit explained that if the lia-
bility limitations effected a "taking," then the plaintiffs would be entitled
to compensation from the United States under the Tucker Act.20
The claim that the Warsaw Convention-Montreal Agreement liabil-
ity limitations are unconstitutional takes many forms. The most plausi-
ble constitutional challenge against the liability limitations, however, is
that they are irrational because their original purpose, to aid develop-
ment of international air transportation, is now anachronistic.21 Statis-
tics demonstrating the current maturity of the international air
transportation industry strongly support this challenge.22 If evaluated on
this basis alone, the liability limitations could be found to unconstitution-
the Warsaw Convention limitation on liability for cargo, but reversed the Second Circuit's prospec-
tive ruling that the liability limitation would after sixty days no longer be enforceable.)
17 684 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1983).
18 Id. at 1310; see also infra notes 150-58 and accompanying text.
19 684 F.2d at 1311.
20 The Tucker Act reads in part: 'The Court of Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judg-
ment upon any claim against the United States founded... upon the Constitution." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1491 (1982).
The Supreme Court in the context of considering the Tucker Act, has stated that "a claim
founded upon a taking of property for public use... without just compensation would fall within
the literal words of 'any claim against the United States founded. . . upon the Constitution.'"
Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 126 (1974). The Court concluded that "tak-
ing" claims against the United States are within the jurisdiction of the court of claims. Id
The "treaty" exception to the Tucker Act reads: "Except as otherwise provided by Act of Con-
gress, the United States Claims Court shall not have jurisdiction of any claim against the United
States growing out of or dependent upon any treaty entered into with foreign nations." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1502 (1982). In In re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia, the Ninth Circuit maintained that the statutory
language "growing out of or dependent upon" should be construed narrowly. 684 F.2d 1301, 1311
(1982). The court cited Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 534 F.2d 889 (Ct. C. 1976). Id at
1311. The court of claims in Hughes Aircraft established that "the test under § 1502 is whether the
plaintiff's claim could conceivably exist independently of, or separate and apart from, the subject
treaty." Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 534 F.2d 889, 903 (Ct. Cl. 1976). Under this test,
claims that "could conceivably" be based on domestic law in the absence of the Convention fall
outside the treaty exception to the Tucker Act. For example, the treaty exception did not apply in
Bali because the wrongful death actions were based on California law. See In re Aircrash in Bali,
Indonesia, 684 F.2d at 1311.
21 See infra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
22 See infra note 80 and accompanying text.
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ally violate substantive due process.23
However, the liability limitations also have a second purpose-to
induce foreign nations to adhere to the Warsaw Convention-Montreal
Agreement.24 The legitimacy of this international bargaining objective
depends on whether the other provisions of the Warsaw Convention-
Montreal Agreement are a quid pro quo for the liability limitations.25 If
they are, then the liability limitations are rationally related to a legiti-
mate purpose, and so will be upheld against a due process challenge.26
This challenge may succeed, on the other hand in the absence of a quid
pro quo.27 Nevertheless, the potential success of such a challenge under
such circumstances is uncertain, because the Supreme Court has not yet
determined whether due process requires a quid pro quo for limitations
on liability.28
Still, even if they are a rational means to a legitimate purpose, the
liability limitations could conceivably effect a "taking of property with-
out just compensation., 29 A "taking" challenge should fail, however,
because the liability limitations limit rather than eliminate claims.3" For
this reason, the Ninth Circuit in Bali should not have remanded for a
determination on the "taking" question. Instead, the Ninth Circuit
needed to reach the plaintiffs' equal protection, substantive due process,
and right-to-travel challenges in order to decide the case before it.
The equal protection claim closely tracks the substantive due pro-
cess claim. Both claims will succeed only if the liability limitations prove
not to be means rationally related to a legitimate purpose.31
A right-to-travel challenge to the liability limitations should also
fail.32 The liability limitations simply do not restrict travel.33 Nor do the
liability limitations impose a prohibitive penalty on international air trav-
elers.34 There is no constitutional right to the most desirable liability
terms nor to the least expensive transportation.35
Even after the Supreme Court's decision in Franklin Mint, there re-
23 See infra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
24 See infra note 73 and accompanying text.
25 See infra note 149 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 131-37 and accompanying text.
27 See infra note 138 and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 127-88 and accompanying text.
29 See infra notes 150-202 and accompanying text.
30 See infra notes 195-202 and accompanying text.
31 See infra note 75.
32 See infra notes 203-29 and accompanying text.
33 See infra notes 224-29 and accompanying text.
34 See infra notes 206 and 219-25 and accompanying text.
35 See infra notes 228-29 and accompanying text.
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mains the question of whether the liability limitations, converted to dol-
lars at the last official price of gold, are unconstitutionally low. Whether
the liability limitations are unconstitutionally low, however, may depend
on whether the other provisions of the Warsaw Convention-Montreal
Agreement still provide an adequate quid pro quo for the liability
limitations.36
This Comment is concerned with the merits of constitutional chal-
lenges to the liability limitations.3 7  Section 113  defines two important
terms, "means" and "purpose." Section II13 addresses the question of
whether the liability limitations violate substantive due process. The
principle question there is whether the liability limitations are a means
rationally related to a legitimate purpose. Section IV4 raises the ques-
tion of whether the other provisions of the Warsaw Convention-Montreal
Agreement are a quid pro quo for the liability limitations. Section V41
addresses the question of whether the liability limitations violate the fifth
amendment by affecting a "taking without just compensation." Finally,
Section V142 addresses the question of whether the liability limitations
violate the fundamental right to travel.
II. MEANS AND PURPOSES
A. Definitions
In T. W.A., Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp.,43 the United States Supreme
Court found that the Civil Aeronautics Board's (CAB's)" use of the last
36 See infra note 149 and accompanying text.
37 A potential non-constitutional challenge to the Warsaw Convention's gold-based limitation on
liability for baggage and cargo could be based on congressionally mandated consistency between
agency action and the Convention itself. Such a challenge would allege that the agency (formerly the
CAB, but now the Department of Transportation. See infa note 44.) has failed to adjust the gold-
dollar unit of conversion as necessary to effectuate the Convention's purpose of international uni-
formity. Such a challenge, however, is contingent on both "the dollar's changing value relative to
other western currencies" and "changes in the conversion rates adopted by other Convention signa-
tories." 104 S.Ct. at 1785. This Comment, however, is concerned only with constitutional
challenges.
38 See infra notes 58-74 and accompanying text.
39 See infra notes 75-126 and accompanying text.
40 See infra notes 127-49 and accompanying text.
41 See infra notes 150-202 and accompanying text.
42 See infra notes 203-29 and accompanying text
43 104 S. CL 1776 (1984).
44 The CAB no longer exists. 49 U.S.C. § 1551 (1984). The Department of Transportation, in
consultation with the Department of State, now has the Federal Aviation Program authority with
respect to foreign air transportation. 49 U.S.C. § 1551(b)(1)(B) (1984). For simplicity, however,
this Comment will follow the Supreme Court's example of referring only to the CAB. See 104 S. Ct.
at 1780 n.3.
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official price of gold4" as the unit of conversion 46 to dollars for the War-
saw Convention's gold-based47 liability limitations is consistent with the
Convention's purposes.48 In reaching this conclusion the Court identi-
fied two purposes of the Warsaw Convention: first, to set some limitation
on liability; and second, to set a stable, predictable and internationally
uniform limit that would encourage development of the then fledgling
airline industry.4 9 The Court concluded that the CAB's use of the last
official price of gold as the unit of conversion is consistent with both of
these purposes.5
The Court also considered as a third purpose of the Convention the
setting of liability limitations that would keep step with inflation."' The
Court found that use of the last official price of gold as the unit of conver-
sion was inconsistent with this purpose.52 The Court excused the incon-
sistency, however, because during the first fifty years of the Warsaw
Convention's operation, the signatory nations, including the United
States, had allowed the real value of the liability limitations to decline
substantially.53 The Court viewed this long-established practice as a
course of performance useful for construing a "'contract' among na-
tions."' 54 Accordingly, the Court concluded that use of the last official
price of gold as the unit of conversion, even though the purchasing power
of the dollar had declined, was not inconsistent with the purposes of the
Convention.5 5 Implicitly, then, setting liability limitations that would
keep step with inflation is not really a purpose of the Warsaw Conven-
tion. Otherwise, the Court could not have found frustration of this goal
to be consistent with the purposes of the Convention.
45 Effective 1978, Congress repealed the official price of gold. Bretton Woods Agreement Act of
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-564, § 6, 90 Stat. 2660 (1976); See TW.A, 104 S. Ct. at 1782 n.15.
In Franklin Mint, the Court found that congressional repeal of the official price of gold was not
intended to affect the Warsaw Convention. Id. at 1784. Accordingly, the Court concluded that use
of the last official price of gold ($42.22 per ounce) as the unit of conversion for the Warsaw Conven-
tion's gold-based liability limitations was consistent with domestic legislation. IM at 1787 & n.26.
46 Article 22(4) of the Warsaw Convention permits conversion of its gold-based liability limita-
tions into any national currency, but the Convention provides no rates of conversion. See Id. at 1784
n.26; see supra note 3.
47 The liability limitation for personal injury or death is $75,000 per passenger under the Mon-
treal Agreement, but the liability limitations for baggage and cargo remain the original Warsaw
Convention amounts in millimeters of gold. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
48 104 S. Ct. at 1787 (1984).
49 Id. at 1785.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 1786.
52 Id.
53 IM. at 1786-87.
54 Id at 1787.
55 Id
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In Franklin Mint, the Court identified the Warsaw Convention's
purposes, not to test the constitutionality of the liability limitations, but
in order to test for consistency between CAB action and the Convention
itself.56 Such consistency was required not by the Constitution, but by
congressional legislation. 7 As a result, although the Court held that the
use of the last official price of gold as the unit of conversion is consistent
with the Warsaw Convention, there remains the question, unaddressed
by the Supreme Court in Franklin Mint, of whether the Warsaw Conven-
tion-Montreal Agreement liability limitations are themselves constitu-
tional. Accordingly, when constitutionality of the liability limitations is
at issue, the purposes of the Convention should be examined in a differ-
ent light.
When the constitutionality of a treaty provision is at issue, it is help-
ful to think of the purpose of the treaty or treaty provision as the objec-
tive, goal, or end for which the treaty or provision is designed. By
contrast, the means of a treaty provision may be viewed as the directive,
or command, designed to achieve the treaty's purpose.
Unfortunately, in a case where constitutional issues were raised
(though not reached), the Ninth Circuit did not adopt the above distinc-
tions between purpose and means. In In re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia,"8
the court stated that the Warsaw Convention's "purposes are two-fold:
providing uniformity in respect to documentation and certain procedural
matters, and imposing limitations on liability."59 The first purpose de-
fined by the Ninth Circuit should have included uniformity of substan-
tive rules as well.'
The court's definition of the second purpose, however, contains a
more egregious flaw. By defining "imposing limitations on liability" as a
purpose of the Convention, the court implicitly nullified any claim that
the liability limitation is not rationally related to the purpose of the Con-
vention. A liability limitation will always be rationally related to the
purpose of "imposing limitations on liability."
Apparently, the Ninth Circuit did not realize that "imposing limita-
tion on liability" is a means to an end rather than an end itself. That is,
"imposing limitations on liability" is not, of itself, a purpose of the Con-
vention. Properly analyzed, the issue is whether the liability limitations
are rationally related to their purpose of aiding development of interna-
56 See supra notes 43-55 and accompanying text.
57 See 104 S. Ct. at 1781; 49 U.S.C. § 1502(a) (1984).
58 684 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1982).
59 Id at 1307.
60 See infra note 74 and accompanying text.
61 See supra note 3 and infra note 74.
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tional air transportation, for only then may they be found reasonable.
An additional requirement of reasonableness, of course, is that aiding
development of international air transportation be a legitimate purpose.6 2
The Ninth Circuit is not the only court which, in analyzing the lia-
bility limitations, confused the distinction between purpose and means.
In Reed v. Wiser,63 the Second Circuit stated: "It is beyond dispute that
the purpose of the liability limitation proscribed by Article 22 was to fix
at a definite level the cost to airlines of damages sustained by their pas-
sengers and of insurance to cover such damages."6
The Second Circuit's definition of purpose makes the liability limita-
tion virtually unassailable by a rationality challenge. The liability limita-
tion is certainly rationally related to the purpose of fixing at a definite
level the cost of insurance to the airlines. A better test of rationality
would have examined the relationship between the liability limitations
and the development of international air transportation.
B. Legislative History
The Senate ratilied the Warsaw Convention in 1934 without hear-
ings or debates.6 5 As a result, the primary source of legislative history
relied upon by the courts is a letter written by Secretary of State Cordell
Hull. Mr. Hull's letter accompanied the Convention in its transmission
to the Senate in 1934. The portion of the Hull letter pertaining to the
liability limitations reads:
It is believed that the principle of limitation of liability will not only be
beneficial to passengers and shippers as affording a more definite basis of
recovery and as tending to lessen litigation, but that it will prove to be an
aid in the development of international air transportation, as such limita-
tion will afford the carrier a more definite basis on which to obtain insur-
ance rates, with the probable result that there would eventually be a
reduction of operating expenses for the carrier and advantages to travelers
and shippers in the way of reduced transportation charges.
The first effect attributed to the liability limitations-"to afford a
more definite basis of recovery"-does not square with the facts. Article
22 did not affect the basis of recovery. The liability limitations were not
amounts assured to successful claimants. Rather, claimants had to prove
62 See Bennet, "Mere" Rationality in Constitutional Law: Judicial Review and Democratic The-
ory, 67 CAmF. L. Rnv. 1049, 1060 (1979).
63 555 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1977).
64 Id. at 1089.
65 See In re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia, 684 F.2d at 1308.
66 Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, Message from the President of the United States Trans-
mitting a Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules, S. Exec. Doc. No. G, 73d Cong., 2d sess.
3-4 (1934).
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the extent of their damages.67 The liability limitations of Article 22
would be applied only in cases where recovery founded on some other
basis, such as Article 17's presumption of liability,6 would have ex-
ceeded the limits. Hence, the liability limitations are not bases for recov-
ery, but ceilings on recovery. As a result, the first effect specified by the
Hull letter must be disregarded.
The second effect specified by the Hull letter-"to lessen litiga-
tion"-is more plausible. By limiting the range of possible recoveries,
the liability limitations reduce uncertainty about the costs and benefits of
trial vis-a-vis settlement. By reducing this uncertainty, the liability limi-
tations increase the likelihood of settlement. The increased likelihood of
settlement, however, is the direct result of improving the bargaining posi-
tion of carriers vis-a-vis passengers and shippers. As a result, the amount
of the settlement will surely be lower than that in a regime of unlimited
liability. The reduction in litigation resulting from the liability limita-
tions alone, then, is strictly a one-sided benefit to carriers.
The third effect listed in the Hull letter-"to aid in the development
of international air transportation"-made sense in 1934. The means, as
distinguished from the purpose, of Article 22 is limited liability.69 Lim-
ited liability, then, was the means to the end of developing international
air transportation.
According to Secretary Hull, however, there are two intermediate
effects between the means of limited liability and the ultimate purpose of
67 No article of the Warsaw Convention guarantees the amount of recovery for successful claim-
ants. Article 24(l) of the Warsaw Convention reads: "In cases covered by Articles 18 and 19, any
action for damages, however founded, can only be brought subject to the conditions and limits set
out in this convention." Articles 17 and 18 of the Warsaw Convention establish the presumption of
carrier liability. See infra note 68.
68 Article 17 of the Convention creates the presumption of carrier's liability for personal injury
and death of passengers. Article 17 reads:
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the death or wounding of a
passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger, if the accident which caused the
damage so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of
embarking or disembarking.
Article 18(1) creates the same presumption for damage to or loss of baggage and cargo. Article
18(1) reads: "The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the destruction or loss
of, or of damage to, any checked baggage or any goods, if the occurrence which caused the damage
so sustained took place during the transportation by air."
The effect of Articles 17 and 18(1) is to shift the burden of proof on the liability issue from
passenger or shipper to the airlines. Airlines could, however, shift the burden of proof back to the
passenger or shipper under Article 20(1), which provides for an affirmative defense of due care.
Article 20(l) reads: 'he carrier shall not be liable if he proves that he and his agents have taken all
necessary measures to avoid the damage or that it was impossible for him or them to take such
measures." Nevertheless, under the Montreal Agreement, the airlines waived their Article 20(1)
defense. See supra note 5.
69 See supra note 3.
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aiding development of international air transportation. The first interme-
diate effect of limited liability was to "afford the carrier a more definite
basis on which to obtain insurance rates."70 This first intermediate effect
was a means to the second intermediate effect-"to reduce operating ex-
penses for the carrier."71 This second intermediate effect was in turn a
means to the ultimate purpose of liability limitation-"to aid the devel-
opment of international air transportation."72 As a result, it is possible
to view these intermediate effects not so much as independently signifi-
cant purposes, but more fundamentally as mere means to an ultimate
purpose.
Whether these intermediate effects are considered means or pur-
poses is critical to the determination of whether the liability limitations
are rationally related to their purpose. Here, it is easier to find a rational
relationship if the intermediate effects are considered purposes, too, then
if only the ultimate purpose is considered a purpose. For example, it is
easier to show that limited liability is a rational means to the end of more
definite bases for insurance rates than to show that limited liability is a
rational means to the ultimate purpose of developing international air
transportation.
Finally, the Hull letter omits a major purpose of the liability limita-
tions-to induce foreign nations to adhere to the other provisions of the
Convention.73 In sum, the liability limitations of Article 22 have two
main purposes-to aid development of international air transportation
and to induce foreign nations to adhere to the other provisions of the
Convention. To these two purposes, the Warsaw Convention as a whole
adds a third purpose-to provide uniformity of documentation and rules
applicable to international air transportation.74
70 See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
71 Id
72 Id
73 "Some (countries) even contended that the limit (on liability) was too high, thus discouraging
a number of countries. . . from adhering to the Convention. Raising the limits, therefore, would
only further impede the desired universality." Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, supra note 4, at 504.
74 Id. at 498-500. Although Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn label limited liability a "goal" of the
Convention rather than a "means," implicitly they recognize that limited liability is a means to
"enable airlines to attract capital that might otherwise be scared away for fear of a single cata-
strophic accident." Id at 499. Nevertheless, the authors are explicit in their recognition of uniform-
ity in rules and documentation as the other purpose of the Convention. Id at 498-99.
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III. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS:7 5 RATIONAL MEANS;
LEGITIMATE PuRPosEs
A. In re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia: The District Court Level
In In re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia,76 the district court correctly
identified one of the Warsaw Convention's two major purposes: "The
need to protect the infant airline industry was a clear rationale behind
the adherence by the United States to the Warsaw Convention." 7  The
district court seemed poised to decline to enforce the liability limitations
on grounds that they are no longer rationally related to their purpose.
The court said, "the limitation imposed by Warsaw made sense at the
time because the developing airline needed to have some assurance that it
would not be financially wiped out by a catastrophic accident. A totally
75 In Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978), the Supreme
Court stated:
Although the District Court also found the Price-Anderson Act to contravene the "equal
protection provision that is included within the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment,"
appellees have not relied on this ground since the equalprotection arguments largely track and
duplicate those made in support of the due process claim. In any event, we conclude that there is
no equal protection violation. The general rationality of the Price-Anderson Act liability
limitations-particularly with reference to the important congressional purpose of encouraging
private participation in the exploitation of nuclear energy-is ample justification for the
difference in treatment between those injured in nuclear accidents and those whose injuries are
derived from other causes. Speculation regarding other arrangements that might be used to
spread the risk of liability in ways different from the Price-Anderson Act is, of course, not
pertinent to the equal protection analysis. Id at 93-94 (emphasis added).
In this Comment also, the equal protection analysis would "largely track and duplicate, the substan-
tive due process analysis." Id at 93. For this reason, the claim that the liability limitations violate
equal protection is not explicitly analyzed in this comment. The equal protection analysis is implicit
in the due process analysis.
76 462 F. Supp. 1114 (C.D. Cal. 1978), rev'd, 684 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1982). This case involved
wrongful death actions brought against Pan American World Airways, Inc., by survivors of two
passengers killed in the April 22, 1974 aircrash. At the district court level, the jury awarded under
state law damages of $300,000 for one passengers and $651,500 for the other. The district court
refused to reduce each award to the $75,000 per passenger Warsaw Convention-Montreal Agree-
ment liability limitation. The district court reasoned that (1) the $75,000 per passenger Warsaw
Convention-Montreal Agreement liability limitation is contractual between passenger and airline;
(2) under California law, a decedent's contract is unenforceable to the extent it compromises the
survivor's right to a wrongful death recovery; therefore, (3) the $75,000 per passenger Warsaw Con-
vention-Montreal Agreement liability limitation is unenforceable against the passenger's survivors'
wrongful death damage awards. Id. at 1116-17.
If the district court had stopped its reasoning at this point, it would have at least been logically
consistent. Instead, the court went on to contradict itself. After first stating that the basis of the
Warsaw Convention-Montreal Agreement liability limitation was contractual, the court then men-
tioned that "[t]o the degree that the Warsaw Convention has effect in this court, it has so as a federal
treaty. In deciding its interpretation, this court must consider what result is demanded by federal
public policy." Id. at 1124. To consider federal public policy relevant to the question of whether the
$75,000 liability limitation was enforceable is inconsistent with the district court's initial premise
that the liability limitation was purely contractual.
77 Id at 1125.
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different situation exists today."7 The district court explained that the
air transportation industry had completely emerged from its infancy at
the time of United States adherence to the Convention in 1934.' 9 The
court cited statistics demonstrating sharp increases in passenger miles
and dramatic improvements in safety. 0 The court concluded that the
airline industry today is "technologically and commercially mature.""1
In effect, the district court decided that a purpose of the passenger liabil-
ity limitation-to aid development of international air transportation-
was no longer a legitimate purpose. For the district court, that purpose
had lost its legitimacy because of changes in federal public policy.
Nevertheless, the district court did not explicitly consider whether
the liability limitation is still rationally related to its purpose. Instead,
the district court maintained that "to the degree that the Warsaw Con-
vention has effect in this court, it has so as a federal treaty. The court's
interpretation must take into account the result demanded by federal
public policy."8 2
The district court cited recent Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) or-
ders and the Airline Deregulation Act of 197883 to support the proposi-
tion that federal public policy towards airlines had shifted from an infant
industry's protectionist-oriented approach to a competitive market-ori-
ented approach. 4 On this basis, the district court concluded that mod-
em federal public policy required nonenforcement of the liability
limitations.8 5
The district court ignored the second purpose of the liability limita-
tions-to induce foreign nations to adhere to the other provisions of the
Convention. More generally, the district court overlooked an important
difference between domestic legislation and federal treaties. Treaties de-
pend on voluntary associations of self-policing entities. Domestic legisla-
tion, of course, does not. Domestic legislation is based on purposes
grounded on exclusively national interests. In negotiating a treaty, how-
ever, the same national interests must be compromised in order to induce
foreign nations to adhere to the treaty. For example, the United States
has compromised its interest in full compensation in order to induce for-





82 Id at 1124. See supra note 76.
83 49 U.S.C. § 1301 note (1982).
84 462 F. Supp. at 1125-26.
85 Id. at 1126.
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Warsaw Convention.16 As a result, federal public policy is a poor guide
to assessing the purpose of a treaty provision. Domestic policy ignores
the international bargaining aspects of seemingly undesirable treaty pro-
visions such as Article 22.
B. In re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia: The Court of Appeals Level
1. Rejection of The District Court's Public Policy Approach
In In re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia,87 the United States Court of
Appeals, Second Circuit, criticized the district court's public policy anal-
ysis. The court of appeals stated: "Unfortunately, we know of no doc-
trine that would allow us to examine congressional enactments to see if
they still serve the purpose for which they were designed."88 This state-
ment reveals that the court of appeals misunderstood the district court.
The district court did not base its decision on whether the Warsaw Con-
vention still served its original purpose. Instead, the district court deter-
mined that federal public policy had evolved in tandem with the
development of the air transportation industry.89 The district court re-
fused to enforce the liability limitations.90 The district court's refusal,
86 See infra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
87 684 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1982). See supra note 76.
Here, the court of appeals concluded that the district court was correct to apply California law.
Nevertheless, the Second Circuit held that the $75,000 per passenger Warsaw Convention-Montreal
Agreement liability limitation preempts state law. The Second Circuit reasoned that: (I) the War-
saw Convention is a valid treaty of the United States and is therefore federal law; (2) federal law
preempts any state law that "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purpose and objectives of Congress"; (3) one of the dual purposes of the Warsaw Convention is to
impose a limitation on liability; therefore (4) the Warsaw Convention as modified by the Montreal
Agreement requires reduction of damage awards to the $75,000 per passenger liability limitation,
notwithstanding California law. Id. at 1307-08.
Both the district court and the court of appeals interpreted the Warsaw Convention as a federal
treaty. Nevertheless, the two courts reached opposite results. The court of appeals focused on the
original purpose of the framers of the Convention, Id. at 1308, whereas the district court had rea-
soned that changes in federal public policy had negated the original purpose of the Convention. 462
F. Supp. at 1124-26. These differences in approach not only explain the differences in results, but
also illustrate the controversy about the appropriate role of the judiciary in interpreting federal trea-
ties.
The court of appeals' approach is preferrable to that of the district court. It is appropriate to
consider the intent of the framers and the original purpose when interpreting or applying a federal
treaty provision. It is extrajudicial, however, to decide against the clear language and intent of a
federal treaty provision merely because the court determines that enforcement is contrary to current
public policy. This approach taken by the district court is legislative rather than judicial.
The court of appeals, however, was mistaken to dub limitation of liability a "purpose" rather
than a "means" to achieving purposes.
88 684 F.2d at 1308.
89 462 F. Supp. at 1124-25.
90 Id. at 1124.
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however, was not because the means of limited liability no longer served
its original purpose. Rather, the district court found that the original
purpose of aiding development of international air transportation was no
longer legitimate in light of modern federal public policy.9 1
A more egregious flaw in the statement by the court of appeals is
that it ignores the fundamental principle that Congressional enactments
must be rationally related to a legitimate purpose. In the context of this
rationality requirement, the district court's statistics on development of
the air transportation industry would have found their proper place. The
district court could have reasoned that as a result of dramatic improve-
ments in safety, finance, and availability of insurance, the liability limita-
tion was no longer rationally related to the purpose of aiding
development of international air transportation.
Whether a challenge to the rationality of the liability limitation
could succeed depends upon the definition of purposes. The court of ap-
peals stated that limited liability is one of the dual purposes of the Con-
vention.92 Under this definition, the challenge that the means is not
rational will always fail. A means that is one in the same with its end is
always rationally related to that end. Hence, a liability limitation is a
means always rationally related to the end of limiting liability.
The court of appeals should have recognized that limiting liability is
a means rather than an end. The court could have then directly formu-
lated the rationality analysis into the appropriate questions: Is the liabil-
ity limitation a rational means for the purpose of aiding development of
international air transportation? Is this purpose legitimate?
2. Substantiality of the Due Process Challenge
In Bali, the Ninth Circuit never reached the substantive due process
challenge to the liability limitation, but did find that the plaintiffs' argu-
ment was "substantial."93 The court of appeals prefaced its finding of a
"substantial" due process argument with a reiteration of the plaintiffs'
statistical demonstration that the "airline industry is no longer in its in-
fancy."'94 Moreover, the court noted the absence of any allegation that
domestic airlines, without the protection of the Warsaw Convention, had
been unable to procure insurance. 95  The court also cited statistical
sources suggesting that "the increased cost of insurance if the Warsaw
91 Id at 1124-26.
92 684 F.2d at 1307.
93 I d at 1310.
94 Id.
95 Id.
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limitation were removed would be insignificant. '9 6 In addition, the court
noted that "it appears that the cost to airlines of additional insurance
would be less than the cost to individual passengers of purchasing trip
insurance."9 7
All of these statements by the court of appeals imply that the liabil-
ity limitations are no longer rationally related to their purpose of aiding
development of international air transportation. Alternatively, the
court's statements imply that the latter purpose has become
anachronistic.
C. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group
In Bali,9 8 the court of appeals compared plaintiffs' substantive due
process and equal protection challenges to those made before the United
States Supreme Court in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental
Study Group.99 The court of appeals concluded that the liability limita-
tion of the Warsaw Convention-Montreal Agreement, like that of the
Price-Anderson Act"° at issue in Duke Power, was an "economic regula-
tion which would be constitutional under the Commerce Clause unless
arbitrary or unreasonable."' 0 ' The court of appeals premised its conclu-
sion on its determination that "the treaty at issue here must withstand
essentially the same tests as would domestic legislation against a claim
that it denies rights guaranteed by the Constitution.' 2
In Duke Power, the Supreme Court upheld the Price-Anderson
Act's $560 million limitation on liability for nuclear accidents in feder-
ally licensed plants.'03 The dual purpose of the Act was to "protect the
public and encourage the development of the atomic energy industry."'"
The $560 million ceiling consisted of contributions from licensees ($315
million), the maximum available coverage under private insurance ($140
million) and a remainder borne by the Federal Government ($105 mil-
lion).10 The Act also provided that "in the event of a nuclear incident
involving damages in excess of [the] amount of aggregate liability, the
Congress. . .will take whatever action is deemed necessary and proper
96 Id.
97 Ia
98 Id at 1309.
99 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
100 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1976).
101 684 F.2d at 1309.
102 Id
103 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
104 Id at 64.
105 Id at 67.
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to protect the public." 10 6 Moreover, those plants indemnified under the
Act in effect waived "all legal defenses in the event of a substantial nu-
clear accident."' 0 7
The Court found the Price-Anderson Act's limitation of liability to
be "a classic example of an economic regulation-a legislative effort to
structure and accommodate 'the burdens and benefits of economic
life.' "108 Accordingly, the Court tested the liability limitation for ration-
ality. The limit would survive the substantive due process challenge un-
less it was determined to be arbitrary or unreasonable. The Court
emphasized that the litigants challenging the Act had not questioned that
some liability limitation might be reasonable.109 Instead, at issue was the
amount of the liability limitation-i.e., the "particular figure of $560 mil-
lion."11 The Court concluded that this amount was reasonable.11
The Court stressed that its finding of reasonableness was "predi-
cated on two corollary assumptions." '112 The first "corollary assump-
tion" was that the risk of an accident involving total claims in excess of
$560 million was "exceedingly remote." '113 The second "corollary as-
sumption" was that Congress, as expressly provided for in that Act,
would procure extraordinary relief in the event of such an accident.114
The Court's finding of reasonableness on the basis of these two co-
rollary assumptions demonstrates that the Court's rationality analysis fo-
cused on the relationship of the $560 million liability limitation to the
purpose of protecting the public. The other purpose of the Price-Ander-
son Act--development of private nuclear energy-was not really at issue.
If that purpose had been at issue, then the court would have had to con-
clude that the lower the liability limitation, the more rationally related it
would be to the development of private nuclear energy. By contrast, the
Court would have also concluded that the lower the liability limitation,
the less reasonably related it would be to the purpose of protecting the
public.
In sum, at issue in Duke Power was the question of whether the
Price-Anderson Act established a liability limitation that was too low to
be rationally related to its purpose of protecting the public. It is still an
106 Iaj at 66-67.
107 Id at 65.
108 Id. at 83.
109 Id. at 84.
110 Id. at 84 (emphasis in original).
111 Id. at 86-87.
112 Id. at 85.
113 Id. at 86.
114 Id at 85.
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open question whether the Court would have found $560 million to be
reasonable in the absence of the "two corollary assumptions."
D. Liability Limitations: Rational Means to Legitimate Purposes?
In Bali, the Second Circuit was correct to note that domestic legisla-
tion, such as the Price-Anderson Act, and federal treaties, such as the
Warsaw Convention, must withstand essentially the same tests in the
face of constitutional challenges.' Nevertheless, the Second Circuit was
not justified in dubbing the Warsaw Convention liability limitation an
"economic regulation."'"16
One of the two basic purposes of the Warsaw Convention liability
limitation is to induce foreign nations to adhere to the other provisions of
the Convention." 7 Given this international bargaining purpose, the War-
saw Convention liability limitation does not fit neatly into the Supreme
Court's definition of "economic regulation."
'"18
In Duke Power, the Court implied that an economic regulation is a
"legislative effort to structure and accommodate 'the burdens and bene-
fits of economic life.' """ Inducing foreign nations to adhere to a treaty
is not the same as structuring and accommodating economic burdens and
benefits. Hence, the liability limitation, as an international bargaining
concession, is not an economic regulation.
Nevertheless, the Warsaw Convention liability limitation has an-
other purpose-to aid development of international air transportation. 20
In light of this purpose, the liability limitation looks more like an eco-
nomic regulation. The Court's definition of an economic regulation' 21
envisages two groups-(1) those who receive a net benefit at the expense
of (2) those on whom a net burden is imposed. The Price-Anderson Act,
for example, benefits consumers of nuclear energy while imposing a net
burden on those residing close to nuclear power plants.
The Warsaw Convention liability limitation, by contrast, benefits
airlines but, in theory, does not impose a net burden on passengers and
shippers. In theory, at least, passengers and shippers benefit from the
liability limitation because the limit aids development of international air
transportation. That development in turn increases the supply of inter-
national air transportation necessary to meet the demand of passengers
115 684 F.2d at 1309.
116 Id
117 See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
118 See supra text accompanying note 108; see infra text accompanying note 119.
119 438 U.S. at 83.
120 See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
121 See supra text accompanying notes 108 and 119.
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and shippers. As a result, the liability limitation imposes a net burden on
neither airlines nor passengers and shippers.
Arguably, the absence of a group that suffers a net burden by itself
takes the liability limitation outside the Court's definition of an economic
regulation. Regardless, the liability limitation's international bargaining
purpose cannot be reconciled with the Supreme Court's definition of an
"economic regulation."
Nevertheless, in Bali, the Ninth Circuit was correct to test the
$75,000 per passenger Warsaw Convention-Montreal Agreement liability
limitation against a standard of rationality. 22 Whether the liability limi-
tations are a rational means to a legitimate purpose is still an open ques-
tion, however, because the Ninth Circuit never reached the constitutional
issues. Unfortunately, the court's comparison of liability limitations of
the Warsaw Convention to those of the Price-Anderson Act hinders
more than it helps in answering this question.
In Duke Power, the Supreme Court expressly stated that its finding
of reasonableness of the Price-Anderson Act's $560 million liability limi-
tation was based on "two corollary assumptions." 123 Those twin as-
sumptions of extremely remote risk and extraordinary government relief,
however, have no parallel in the Warsaw Convention-Montreal Agree-
ment liability limitation. International air disasters occur with some reg-
ularity, and the federal government has yet to supplement the $75,000
per passenger limit.1 24 Moreover, the Price-Anderson Act lacks the in-
ternational bargaining purpose inherent in the Warsaw Convention-
Montreal Agreement liability limitation. For these reasons, the test of
reasonableness of the Warsaw Convention-Montreal Agreement liability
limitation must track a course different from that of the Price-Anderson
Act.
Whether the Warsaw Convention-Montreal Agreement liability lim-
itation is unreasonably low depends upon the two purposes of the liabil-
ity limitation. With respect to aiding the development of international
air transportation, the liability limitation is arguably no longer a rational
means because of changed circumstances. Improvements in safety, fi-
nance and availability of insurance may indicate that international air
transportation is beyond the stage where the risk of unlimited liability
would retard its development. Alternatively, even if the liability limita-
tion somewhat aids the further development of the air transportation in-
dustry, such a purpose may now be anachronistic because of the
122 See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
123 See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
124 See supra note 14.
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industry's maturity. 2 '
By contrast, the liability limitation could never be found unreasona-
bly low with respect to its international bargaining purpose. In fact, the
lower the liability limitation the more reasonable it is as a means of in-
ducing foreign nations to adhere to the Convention. This reasonableness,
however, does not mean that the liability limitation can always be upheld
against constitutional attack. Although the relationship of the liability
limitation to its international bargaining purpose is unassailable on ra-
tionality grounds, it can be argued that the other provisions of the Con-
vention do not provide an adequate quid pro quo126 for the liability
limitation.
IV. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS: QUID PRO Quo
A. Bali and Duke Power
In Bali, the Second Circuit acknowledged plaintiff's argument that
the benefits that passengers and shippers derive from other provisions of
the Warsaw Convention "do not constitute a quidpro quo for the liability
limitation."' 7 On the other hand, the Second Circuit also acknowledged
that the United States, apparently as amicus curiae, had argued that
those provisions could substantially benefit passengers and shippers.1 28
In its only comment on the merits of this quidpro quo dispute, the court
appeared to be partially convinced by the plaintiffs: "[lit has been per-
suasively argued that, for U.S. plaintiffs at least, the Convention confers
no procedural benefits in personal injury suits.'
' 129
Moreover, later in its opinion, the Second Circuit responded to foot-
note 32 of the Supreme Court's opinion in Duke Power:
The Supreme Court, in a footnote to Duke Power, observed that '[a] person
has no property, no vested interest, in any rule of the common law'....
The cases cited for this proposition, with one exception, dealt with statutes
creating, not extinguishing, liability....
Furthermore, we are not dealing here with a change in a rule of the
common law. Plaintiffs are not complaining of a change in law, but of the
limitation of an independently existing right under state law....
The Court further observed that 'statutes limiting liability are rela-
125 See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
126 See infra notes 132-35 and accompanying text.
127 684 F.2d at 1310.
128 Id.
129 Id (emphasis added). The court of appeals, however, did not say that the Convention failed
to confer substantive benefits. Even in the absence of procedural benefits, the substantive benefits to
plaintiffs from the presumptions of carrier's liability in Article 17 and 18(1) of the Convention, and
from the strict liability rules established by the Montreal Agreement, could possibly constitute a quid
pro quo for the liability limitations. See infra notes 131-49 and accompanying text.
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tively commonplace and have consistently been enforced by the courts.' Id.
at 88 n.32, 98 S. Ct. at 2638 n.32. The cases cited for this proposition are
most notable for their lack of authority. . . . [For example,] Indemnity
Ins. Co. of North America v. Pan American Airways, 58 F. Supp. 338
(S.D.N.Y. 1944), involved a due process challenge to the Warsaw Conven-
tion, that was rejected in a single sentence. 130
In Duke Power, appellants had claimed that the Price-Anderson Act
violated due process by not providing "a satisfactory quidpro quo for the
common law rights of recovery" which had been abrogated by the Act's
liability limitation.131 The Supreme Court began its decision on the quid
pro quo challenge with the statement: "Initially, it is not at all clear that
the Due Process Clause in fact requires that a legislatively enacted com-
pensation scheme either duplicate the recovery at common law or pro-
vide a reasonable substitute remedy."'132 In footnote 32, which
accompanied this statement, the Court maintained, as seen above, that:
Our cases have clearly established that '[a] person has no property, no
vested interest, in any rule of the common law.'. . . Indeed, statutes limit-
ing liability are relatively commonplace and have consistently been en-
forced by the courts . . . Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America v. Pan
American Airways, 58 F. Supp. 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1944) (Warsaw Convention
limitation on recovery for injuries suffered during international air
travel). 133
Nevertheless, the Court found it unnecessary to reach the question
of whether due process requires a quid pro quo because the Court con-
cluded that "the Price-Anderson Act does, in our view, provide a reason-
130 Id. at 1312 n.10.
The Second Circuit's criticism, if not rejection, of the authority cited by the Supreme Court in
Duke Power raises questions about the proper role for lower courts when interpreting higher court
precedent. The authority of a proposition made by the Supreme Court does not derive solely from
the force of the support cited by the Court. That the Supreme Court has made the proposition is by
itself authority for the proposition. A court of appeals cannot properly disregard that authority by
restricting its inquiry to the supporting citations made by the Supreme Court. Instead, the court of
appeals must recognize that once it has interpreted the Supreme Court to have made a certain propo-
sition, the court of appeals cannot then reach a decision inconsistent with that proposition.
On the other hand, it is not clear that a proposition made by the Supreme Court, in the way of
example or in order to explain its reasoning, should be interpreted by courts of appeals as a steadfast
Supreme Court ruling on that proposition. It may be pure dicta. The Supreme Court may not have
intended that the proposition be strictly followed, particularly in later cases in which much more is
at stake on the proposition. In such cases, the courts of appeals may actually be under a duty to
examine more closely the cases cited by the Supreme Court in support of the proposition. In this
way, the court of appeals may determine just how heavily to weigh the authority for the proposition.
Nevertheless, because the Surpeme Court has made the proposition, the court of appeals, when
giving little weight to the proposition, should be fairly certain that the Supreme Court would do the
same on appeal.
131 438 U.S. at 87-88.
132 Id at 75.
133 Id. at 75 n.32.
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ably just substitute for the common law or state tort law remedies it
replaces." 134 In other words, since the Price-Anderson Act would be up-
held regardless of whether due process requires a quid pro quo, the Court
could decide the "particular case before it"' 135 without determining
whether due process does in fact require a quid pro quo.
In upholding the Price-Anderson Act against the quid pro quo chal-
lenge, the Court relied on its earlier decision in New York Central R. Co.
v. White. 136 In Duke Power, the Court stated:
[I]n New York Central R. Co. v. White, the Court observed that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was not violated simply be-
cause an injured party would not be able to recover as much under the Act
as before its enactment. "[Hie is entitled to moderate compensation in all
cases of injury, and has a certain and speedy remedy without the difficulty
and expense of establishing negligence or proving the amount of the dam-
ages." The logic of New York Central would seem to apply with renewed
force in the context of this challenge to the Price-Anderson Act. The Price-
Anderson Act not only provides a reasonable, prompt, and equitable mech-
anism for compensating victims of a catastrophic nuclear incident, it also
guarantees a level of net compensation generally exceeding that recoverable
in private litigation. Moreover, the Act contains an explicit congressional
commitment to take further action to aid victims of a nuclear accident in
the event that the $560 million ceiling on liability is exceeded. This panoply
of remedies and guarantees is at the least a reasonably just substitute for the
common law rights replaced by the Price-Anderson Act. Nothing more is
required by the Due Process Clause.137
Without a Supreme Court determination of whether due process re-
quires a quid pro quo for liability limitations, it is not clear that the War-
saw Convention-Montreal Agreement limits are constitutional. There
are significant differences between the liability limitations of the Price-
Anderson Act, on the one hand, and those of the Warsaw Convention-
Montreal Agreement, on the other. As a result, it is not certain that
because the Supreme Court has upheld the Price-Anderson Act's liability
limitation against a quid pro quo challenge in Duke Power, the Court
would likewise uphold the Warsaw Convention-Montreal Agreement lia-
bility limitations.
Footnote 32 in Duke Power may be viewed as a Supreme Court im-
primatur on the Warsaw Convention liability limitation. Nevertheless, a
quid pro quo challenge that adequately distinguishes the Warsaw Con-
vention-Montreal Agreement from the Price-Anderson Act might suc-
ceed. It cannot be forgotten, however, that such a challenge would first
134 Id at 75.
135 Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803).
136 New York Central Ry. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1817).
137 438 U.S. at 93.
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have to establish that due process requires a quid pro quo.138
B. Quid Pro Quo
Unlike the Price-Anderson Act, the Warsaw Convention-Montreal
Agreement does not "guarantee a level of net compensation generally
exceeding that recoverable in private litigation."' 39 For example, in Bali,
the jury had awarded the two plaintiffs damages of $300,000 and
$651,000.14 Each of these amounts exceeds the $75,000 per passenger
Warsaw Convention-Montreal Agreement liability limitation. Nor does
the Warsaw Convention-Montreal Agreement suggest a congressional
commitment to procure extraordinary relief when damages exceed the
liability limitation. 4' In spite of these differences, however, the other
provisions of the Convention may still constitute an adequate quid pro
quo for the liability limitations. 42
The fundamental bargain underlying the Warsaw Convention is that
passengers and shippers exchange limitations on carriers' liability in re-
turn for benefits derived from other provisions of the Convention. Chief
among these benefits is the presumption of carrier liability.143 In addi-
tion, Article 2314 prohibits carriers from establishing contractual liabil-
ity limitations at levels lower than those established under Article 22.
The essential bargain of the Montreal Agreement is that the airlines
received continued United States adherence to the Convention in return
for strict liability and an increase in the liability limitation to $75,000 per
passenger. 14 5 The Montreal Agreement took the Convention's presump-
tion of liability a step further. The Montreal Agreement established
strict liability through the airlines' waiver of the due care defense previ-
ously enjoyed under Article 20(1) of the Convention.'"
As a result, under the Warsaw Convention as modified by the Mon-
treal Agreement, passengers and shippers receive a system of strict liabil-
ity in exchange for the modified liability limitations. In addition,
138 See supra text accompanying note 132.
139 See supra text accompanying note 137.
140 See supra note 76.
141 See supra text accompanying note 114.
142 See infra note 149.
143 See supra note 68.
144 Article 23 of the Warsaw Convention reads:
Any provision tending to relieve the carrier of liability or to fix a lower limit than that
which is laid down in this convention shall be null and void, but the nullity of any such provi-
sion shall not involve the nullity of the whole contract, which shall remain subject to the provi-
sions of this convention.
145 CAB Order No. E-23680, 31 Fed. Reg. 730 (1966). See supra note 5. See also O'Rourke v.
Eastern Airlines, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 226, 229 (N.D.N.Y. 1982).
146 O'Rourke, 553 F. Supp. at 229.
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passengers and shippers are assured a right of recovery, are protected
from the provisions of foreign law, and are freed from problems other-
wise created by conflicts of laws. 4 7 Moreover, passengers and shippers
share with carriers in the benefits from the Convention's "creation of a
uniform body of substantive aviation liability law, applicable regardless
of the place of injury, domicile of the passenger or shipper, or the nation-
ality of the airline involved." 148 Nevertheless, the question remains
whether all of these benefits together constitute a quid pro quo for the
liability limitations. 149
V. TAKING WITHOUT JUST COMPENSATION
A. The Taking Issue Raised Sua Sponte
In In re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia,150 the United States Court of
Appeals, Ninth Circuit, sua sponte raised the question of whether the
reduction of plaintiffs' damages to the $75,000 per passenger liability lim-
itation of the Warsaw Convention-Montreal Agreement constitutes a
"taking without just compensation." ' l The court of appeals remanded
147 See Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079, 1091-92 (2d Cir. 1977).
148 The Second Circuit cited the language quoted here to a May 26, 1965 letter written by the
Civil Aeronautics Board. Id at 1901.
149 In Reed v. Wiser, the Second Circuit implied that other provisions of the Warsaw Conven-
tion-Montreal Agreement do provide a quidpro quo for the liability limitations. Id at 1091-92. By
contrast, the most frequently cited law review article about the Warsaw Convention narrows the
advantages of the Warsaw Convention-Montreal Agreement to speed and economy of settlement.
Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, supra note 4, at 516-32. Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn conclude however
that the $75,000 per passenger limit "looks reasonable at this time [1967]." I at 601. Nevertheless,
the authors imply that the limit would continue to be reasonable only if "the prediction that cases
will be settled quickly and economically" is accurate. Ifd at 600.
A quidpro quo analysis should exclude from consideration any benefits inlering in the Warsaw
Convention-Montreal Agreement that United States negotiators could have obtained without mak-
ing a concession on the liability limitations. For example, uniformity of documentation and rules
could likely have been obtained without such a concession, because all the parties and nations in-
volved had a shared interest in uniformity. Under such a quid pro quo analysis, the essential ques-
tion is whether strict carrier liability under the Montreal Agreement is a quidpro quo for the $75,000
per passenger liability limitation. For cargo and baggage, the question is whether presumed carrier
liability under the Warsaw Convention is a quidpro quo for liability limitations converted from gold
to dollars.
In 1967 the quid pro quo for the $75,000 per passenger liability limitations may have been
adequate. Nevertheless, today the reduced real value of the liability limitations may imply that this
quidpro quo is no longer adequate. Since 1967, the real value of the $75,000 per phssenger liability
limitation has been eroded by inflation. Similarly, the real value of cargo and baggage liability limi-
tations, evaluated at the artificially depressed official price of gold, have also been eroded by infla-
tion. Although the quidpro quo may be adequate for some level of liability limitation, the particular
low level of today's real-valued liability limitations may make that same quid pro quo inadequate.
150 684 F.2d at 1310.
151 "No person shall be. . .deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor
shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation." U.S. CONSr. amend. V.
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to the court of claims for a determination on the "taking" issue. The
court of appeals explained that if the court of claims were to find a tak-
ing, then the plaintiffs would receive compensation from the United
States under the Tucker Act. 152 The court of appeals noted that if the
plaintiffs were to receive compensation in this manner, they could not
then successfully challenge the constitutionality of the liability limita-
tions.'53 By raising the taking issue sua sponte and then remanding to the
court of claims, the court of appeals avoided the substantive due process,
equal protection, and right to travel issues that the plaintiffs had
raised.1
5 4
Although the court of appeals left the final determination on the
"taking" question to the court of claims, the Ninth Circuit did make
some preliminary determinations. The Ninth Circuit established that
plaintiffs' claims for compensation were "property."' 15 The court also
indicated that the value of those claims were $300,000 and $651,000, the
amounts that had been awarded by jury under state law.' 56 Presumably,
if the court of claims were to find a taking, the amount of compensation
due plaintiffs from the United States would be such amounts minus the
$75,000 per passenger liability limitation.
The court of appeals guided the court of claims' determination on
the taking issue. The Ninth Circuit explained its view of current "tak-
ing" jurisprudence: "We take it to be the view of the majority of the
Supreme Court that '[t]he general rule at least is, that while property
may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking.' "151 The court of appeals then came close to
actually ruling on the merits when it observed: "We can see no reason
why these plaintiffs' claims are any different, for fifth amendment pur-
poses, from the claims of various creditors against the government of
Iran, see Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. at 689, 101 S. Ct. at
2992." 158
B. Dames & Moore v. Regan
In Dames & Moore v. Regan,159 the issue was whether Congress, by
152 684 F.2d at 1310. See supra note 22.
153 "[I]f the loss claimed is compensable, the regulation will not be found unconstitutional." 684
F.2d at 1311.
154 Id. at 1310-11.
155 Id. at 1312.
156 Id. at 1312 n.l1; see supra note 69.
157 684 F.2d at 1311 n.7.
158 Id at 1312.
159 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
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enacting the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(IEEPA),16 ° had authorized certain emergency measures taken by the
President. During the 1979-81 hostage crisis with Iran, the President
through various executive orders and regulations did two things. First,
the President nullified attachment of Iranian assets and transferred those
assets to Iran.' 6 ' Second, the President suspended claims against Iran
pending in American courts.'62
In Dames & Moore, the Supreme Court held that the IEEPA ex-
pressly authorized the President's nullification of attachments and trans-
fer of assets. 163 The Court explained that the attachments were not
property for fifth amendment purposes because those attachments were
completely subordinate to and dependent upon the President's power
under IEEPA.' 64
The Court's holding on the suspension of claims was more complex.
The Court concluded that IEEPA did not expressly authorize Presiden-
tial suspension of the claims.1 65 Nevertheless, the Court concluded that
the President was authorized to suspend the claims for two other rea-
sons. First, the IEEPA together with the Hostage Act of 1868 implied a
broad scope of executive action under the circumstances. 66 Second, in-
ternational claim settlement by the executive had been "a systematic, un-
broken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of Congress
and never before questioned."'1 67 As a result, the President's suspension
of claims enjoyed a presumption of congressional consent.
Although the Court held that the President's suspension of claims
was authorized, the Court expressly left open the question of whether the
suspension of claims constituted a "taking.' 16 The Court held that the
court of claims, under the Tucker Act, would have jurisdiction of the
"taking" issue.
16 9
Justice Powell 7 ° concurred in the Court's opinion, except that he
disagreed with the Court's holding that nullification of attachments did
160 50 U.S.C. § 1701.
161 453 U.S. at 660.
162 Id at 660.
163 Id at 674.
164 Id at 673 and 674 n.6.
165 Id at 675.
166 I at 676-86.
167 Id at 686. The language quoted is that cited by the Court from Justice Frankfurter's concur-
ring opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
168 453 U.S. at 688-89 n.14.
169 Id at 689-90.
170 Id at 690-91 (Powell, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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not effect a "taking." '17 1 Instead, Justice Powell would have left the issue
open for determination by the court of claims.172 Justice Powell ex-
plained that: "[t]he Government must pay just compensation when it fur-
thers the nation's foreign policy goals by using as 'bargaining chips'
claims lawfully held by relatively few persons and subject to the jurisdic-
tion of our courts."
' 1 7 3
In spite of the Ninth Circuit's assertion to the contrary, the taking
issue in Bali is distinguishable from that in Dames & Moore. The Presi-
dent's nullification of attachments and suspension of claims in Dames &
Moore benefited the hostages and advanced the national interest gener-
ally. Nevertheless, these Presidential actions did not render commensu-
rate reciprocal benefits to those whose attachments were nullified or
claims suspended.
By contrast, the liability limitations at issue in Bali may confer re-
ciprocal benefits upon claimants in the form of the quid pro quo derived
from the other provisions of the Convention.174 Although it is true that
the liability limitation was used as an international "bargaining chip,'
' 7
the bargaining for the Warsaw Convention was in part designed ulti-
mately to benefit the interests of passengers and shippers. 176 These recip-
rocal benefits to claimants in Bali have no parallel for claimants in
Dames & Moore. Whereas the lack of reciprocal benefits to claimants in
Dames & Moore support the finding of a taking in that case, the presence
of reciprocal benefits to claimants in Bali arguably suggests that no "tak-
ing" had occurred. Even if the reciprocal benefits are an inadequate quid
pro quo, however, they may still be substantial enough to preclude a
"taking."
Nevertheless, some commentators, 177 have argued that continued
171 Id. at 690 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
172 Ia (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
173 I d at 691. (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
174 See supra notes 143-49 and accompanying text; see also supra note 5.
175 See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
176 Though the carriers received the chief benefit from Warsaw, the passenger was not entirely
neglected. In the first place, the Convention rendered null and void any provision tending to
relieve the carrier of liability or to fix a limit lower than the one provided in its text (Article 23).
Second, while retaining the principle of liability on the basis of negligence, the Convention
shifted the burden of proof so that the carrier was presumed liable unless it could show that it
had taken all necessary measures to avoid damages, or that it was impossible for it to take such
measures (Article 20).
Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, supra note 4, at 500. See supra notes 5 and 68 for the text of article
20(1) of the Warsaw Convention. Article 23 of the Warsaw Convention reads:
Any provision tending to relieve the carrier of liability or to fix a lower limit than that
which is laid down in this convention shall be null and void, but the nullity of any such provi-
sion shall not involve the nullity of the whole contract, which shall remain subject of the provi-
sions of this convention.
177 See supra note 14.
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United States adherence to the Warsaw Convention is no longer moti-
vated by concern for the interests of passengers and shippers.178 Instead,
these commentators suggest that considerations of foreign policy and in-
ternational prestige are the predominating concerns. 17 9 If these com-
mentators are right, then the United States may be continuing to adhere
to the Warsaw Convention despite the absence of a quid pro quo for the
liability limitations. Without such a quid pro quo, passengers and ship-
pers have their claims limited, but do not enjoy commensurate benefits.
Under these circumstances, the taking issue in Bali becomes like that in
Dames & Moore. In sum, if these commentators are right, then the ques-
tion whether the liability limitations effect a "taking" remains open.
C. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City
In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,'8 0 the
Supreme Court specified two independent grounds for finding a "taking."
A "taking" may occur when a government interference with a property
interest is "not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial
public purpose." '181 Alternatively, a "taking" may occur when the inter-
ference has an "unduly harsh"' 82 impact upon an owner's use of his
property. The Court implied that government interference would not be
considered "unduly harsh" unless it amounted to virtual destruction of
the owner's ordinary use of his interest in the property.' 83 The Court
stressed that even "substantial individualized harm"'84 would not neces-
sarily constitute or amount to a "taking."
Moreover, in Penn Central, the Court maintained that "'taking' ju-
risprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and
attempt to determine whether rights in the segment have been entirely
abrogated."'85 Instead, appropriate analysis of the taking question fo-
cuses on the "parcel as a whole."' 86 In addition, the Court expressed
greater willingness to find a "taking" when the nature of the government
interference was physical invasion than when the "interference arises
from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of eco-
178 Hollings, Defeat of the Montreal Protocols: Victory for Airlines Passengers, 19 TRIAL 20, 24
(1983).
179 Id
180 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
181 Ia at 127.
182 i d
183 Id
184 Id at 125.
185 Id at 130.
186 Id at 131.
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nomic life to promote the common good."'
1 8 7
Justice Rehnquist, 188 dissenting, contended that government inter-
ference with interests in property constitutes a "taking" unless either of
two exceptions applies. The first exception is that interference with nox-
ious uses of property is not a "taking." '1 89 The second exception is that
government interference with non-noxious uses of property is not a "tak-
ing" if an "average reciprocity of advantage" results. 19 0 Zoning is a per-
fect example of this second exception, because all property owners in a
zone are reciprocated by the advantage of neighboring properties being
similarly restricted. 9 '
The majority and the dissent disagreed over the appropriate inter-
pretation of some earlier decision'92 in which the Court had declined to
find a "taking." Justice Rehnquist concluded that these decisions do fall
within his noxious use exception. 193 The Court, however, concluded that
"[t]hese cases are better understood as resting not on any supposed 'nox-
ious' quality of the prohibited uses but rather on the ground that the
restrictions were reasonably related to the implementation of a policy
...expected to produce a widespread public benefit and applicable to
all similarly situated property."' 194
The Court's statement implies an adoption of the reasonableness
standard for review of the "taking" question. A reasonableness analysis
for "takings" purposes would be identical to the reasonableness analysis
that was applied earlier' 95 in the context of the due process challenge to
the liability limitations. Presumably, a finding of unreasonableness
would imply a "taking."' 9 6 If, however, the liability limitations were
found to be reasonable, the inquiry would not be complete. The next
question would be whether the liability limitations impose an "unduly
harsh" economic impact on claimants.
1 9 7
It is doubtful that the Court would find the liability limitations to be
"unduly harsh." The liability limitations do not amount to virtual de-
187 Id at 124.
188 Id at 138-53 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
189 Id at 144-46 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
190 Id at 147-50 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
191 Id. at 147 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
192 Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928);
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
193 438 U.S. at 145 n.8 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
194 I d at 103 n.30 (emphasis added).
195 See supra notes 77-126 and accompanying text.
196 See supra text accompanying note 194.
197 See supra text accompanying notes 181-82.
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struction of the value of a wrongful death claim. 9 ' The claimant still
retains damages up to $75,000 per passenger. The amount the claimant
would have otherwise recovered minus the $75,000, however, does con-
stitute a portion of the claim that is completely destroyed by the liability
limitation. Nevertheless, the Court has refused to examine on a piece-by-
piece basis interference with property interests.'99 Hence, the claimant's
ability to recover $75,000 will preclude his "taking" claim. Moreover,
given the longstanding nature of the liability limitations, the notice provi-
sions of the Convention," 0 and the availability of individual insurance,
the recovery of $75,000 per passenger constitutes the ordinary and ex-
pected interest of the claimant.
The Court has expressed less willingness to find a "taking" "when
public programs are involved than when a physical invasion has oc-
curred."20 ' Perhaps the rationale for this distinction is that public pro-
grams involve distributions of benefits and burdens in a manner that is,
relative to physical invasions, less arbitrary. Following this rationale, the
Court should be even less willing to find that the liability limitation is a
"taking," because the liability limitation is even less arbitrary than social
programs. Whereas social programs redistribute benefits and burdens
from one group to another, the liability limitation as an international
bargaining concession burdens the same group it benefits-passengers
and shippers. In short, assuming that the other provisions of the Con-
vention constitute a quid pro quo for the liability limitations, those limits
would not be found arbitrary. Under this assumption, the liability limi-
tations satisfy Justice Rehnquist's even stricter requirement of an "aver-
age reciprocity of advantage."2 "2 The liability limitations are somewhat
analogous to zoning in the sense that those burdened by the liability limi-
tations have shared in reciprocal benefits derived from the other provi-
sions of the Convention.
198 See supra text accompanying note 183.
199 See supra text accompanying notes 185-86.
200 Article 3 reads in part:
(1) For the transportation of passengers the carrier must deliver a passenger ticket which shall
contain the following particulars...
(e) A statement that the transportation is subject to the rules relating to liability established by
this convention.
(2) . . . if the carrier accepts a passenger without a passenger ticket having been delivered he
shall not be entitled to avail himself of those provisions of this convention which exclude or
limit his liability.
201 See supra text accompanying note 187.
202 See supra text accompanying note 188.
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VI. RIGHT TO TRAVEL
A. The Supreme Court's Right to Travel Doctrine
In In re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia,2 "3 the United States Court of
Appeals, Ninth Circuit, did not reach the plaintiffs' claim that the
$75,000 per passenger Warsaw Convention-Montreal Agreement liability
limitation unconstitutionally violates the right to travel.204 Nevertheless,
the court of appeals established that international travel is a fundamental
right constitutionally protected against restrictions not "carefully tai-
lored to serve a substantial and legitimate government interest."2"5 The
court also maintained that a "penalty on the exercise of the right to
travel is the constitutional equivalent of a direct restriction."2 6 Finally,
the court concluded that the decedent's survivors have standing to bring
constitutional claims based on the decedent's right to travel.
20 7
Three of the four Supreme Court right-to-travel decisions relied
upon by the court of appeals in Bali involved intentional denials of pass-
ports by either Congress or the Secretary of State. In Aptheker v. Secre-
tary of State,2"8 the Supreme Court held that § 6 of the Subversive
Activities Control Act of 1950209 was on its face an unconstitutional vio-
lation of due process under the fifth amendment.210 Section 6 made it
unlawful for any member of a registered Communist organization who
had knowledge or notice of such Communist registration, to apply for or
use a passport. 211 The notice requirement, however, was satisfied merely
by publication in the Congressional Record.212 As a result, even those
members who were unaware of their organization's Communist registra-
tion could be denied passports under § 6.213 For this and similar reasons,
the court found that § 6 swept so broadly that it unconstitutionally vio-
lated the fundamental right to travel.2 14 The court stated that "[t]he de-
nial of a passport is in effect a prohibition against world-wide foreign
travel. '2
15
203 684 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1983).
204 Id. at 1310.
205 Id. at 1309.
206 Id. at 1310.
207 Id.
208 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
209 50 U.S.C. § 782 (1962).
210 378 U.S. at 505 and 514 (1964).
211 Id. at 501-22.
212 Id. at 509.
213 Id. at 509-10.
214 Id. at 509-14.
215 Id. at 507.
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In Zemel v. Rusk,2 16 however, the Supreme Court upheld the Secre-
tary of State's refusal to validate passports for travel to Cuba. Here the
Court distinguished its earlier decision in Kent v. Dulles,2 7 explaining
that:
mhe issue involved in Kent was whether a citizen could be denied a pass-
port because of his political beliefs or associations. In finding that history
did not support the position of the Secretary of State in that case, we sum-
marized that history "so far as material here"-that is, so far as material to
passport refusals based on the character of the particular applicant. In this
case, however, the Secretary has refused to validate appellant's passport not
because of any characteristic peculiar to appellant, but rather because of
foreign policy considerations affecting all citizens.218
Finally, the Ninth Circuit, in Bali, used the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Shapiro v. Thompson to support the proposition that for right-to-
travel purposes, a penalty is equivalent to a direct restriction.219 In Sha-
piro,220 the issue was whether a one-year residency requirement for eligi-
bility to receive welfare benefits was unconstitutional.221 One of the
purposes of the residency requirement was to prevent indigents from
moving into the jurisdiction in order to obtain larger welfare benefits.222
The Supreme Court held that the residency requirements unconstitution-
ally penalized the exercise of the right to move from one jurisdiction to
another.223
B. The Liability Limitations and the Right to Travel
The four Supreme Court right-to-travel decisions relied upon by the
Ninth Circuit in Bali all involved restrictions or penalties that were in-
tentional and direct. By contrast, the effects of the liability limitations on
the exercise of the right to international travel are incidental. In fact, the
liability limitations' ultimate purpose is to facilitate international air
travel. The liability limitations are designed to aid the development of
international air transportation.224 Moreover, unlike passport denials,
the liability limitations do not prohibit travel. Instead, the limitations in
effect shift the cost of insurance from the airlines to the passengers and
shippers.
216 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
217 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
218 381 U.S. at 13.
219 684 F.2d at 1310. See supra text accompanying note 206.
220 394 U.S. 618 (1960).
221 684 F.2d at 1309-10.
222 Id at 623.
223 Id at 641-42.
224 See supra notes 65-74 and accompanying text.
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That passengers and shippers must purchase their own insurance,
however, cannot realistically be viewed as a penalty so severe as to
amount to a direct restriction on travel. For right-to-travel purposes, the
liability limitations are clearly distinguishable, for example, from the
residency requirements at issue in Shapiro v. Thompson.225
The Supreme Court's distinction between Kent v. Dulles, on one
hand, and Zemel v. Rusk, on the other, stressed that even direct prohibi-
tion of the exercise of the right-to-travel would be constitutional if based
on adequate foreign policy considerations.226 Therefore, the liability lim-
itations' purpose to induce foreign nations to adhere to the Convention
may constitute a foreign policy consideration worthy of deference in the
face of constitutional challenges.
Finally, in San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriquez,227 the
Supreme Court made a statement that is applicable by analogy to the
right to travel claim against the liability limitations. The Court asserted:
The Court has long afforded zealous protection against unjustifiable govern-
mental interference with the individual's ights to speak and to vote. Yet
we have never presumed to possess either the ability or the authority to
guarantee to the citizenry the most effective speech or the most informed
electoral choice.228
Similarly, the Court has protected the fundamental right to travel by
strictly scrutinizing constitutionally challenged interference. 229 Never-
theless, neither the Court nor the Constitution guarantees international
airline passengers the most desirable liability terms or the least expensive
transportation.
CONCLUSION
The most plausible constitutional challenge to the Warsaw Conven-
tion-Montreal Agreement liability limitations is that their purpose is ille-
gitimate.230 This challenge would succeed if the only purpose of the
liability limitations was the anachronistic one of aiding the development
of international air transportation.231 The liability limitations, however,
have a second purpose-to induce foreign nations to adhere to the other
provisions of the Convention.232 This purpose is legitimate only if the
225 See supra text accompanying notes 219-23.
226 See supra text accompanying note 218.
227 411 U.S. 1 (1972).
228 Id. at 36 (emphasis in original).
229 Aptheker, 378 U.S. at 507-8.
230 See supra notes 75-126 and accompanying text.
231 See supra notes 76-97 and accompanying text.
232 See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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other provisions of the Convention are a quid pro quo for the liability
limitations.233 The appropriate inquiry-whether such a quid pro quo
exists-is still an open question.234
Enforcement of the liability limitations does not effect a taking with-
out just compensation. 235 The liability limitations do limit the amount of
recovery, but do not eliminate the claim.236 Recovery up to the amount
of the liability limitation is no less than the claimant's reasonable expec-
tation of recovery.237 Because the liability limitations do not affect a
taking, courts should not remand to the United States Claims Court on
this issue.
Nor can a right-to-travel challenge succeed. The liability limitations




233 See supra notes 127-49 and accompanying text.
234 See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
235 See supra notes 150-202 and accompanying text.
236 See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
237 See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
238 See supra notes 203-23 and accompanying text.
